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BOOK REVIEWS
THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM. A report by a Special
Committee of The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1956. Pp. XXVI,
301. $5.00.
Many committees, of many bar associations, have done valuable
work in fields of special interest to lawyers. Not often, however, has
a commercial publisher made the report of such a committee available
to the general public. The recently published Report of the Special
Committee on the Federal Loyalty-Security Program of the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York has now been made so avail-
able. The Special Committee has done its work so well, and the
subject of its Report is of such vital importance, that the Report here
reviewed ought to be read by every thoughtful citizen and carefully
studied by every member of the bar.
Since the cold war started there has been general recognition that
the United States must protect itself against infiltration and corrup-
tion by the hostile forces of what the Report calls "a new kind of
imperialism." At the same time there is general, if not unanimous,
agreement that this country's greatest weapon in the battle for men's
minds is (in the Report's language) "the moral values for which we
stand and toward which we and free peoples everywhere have long
been striving." 1
It is against the background of such convictions that a distin-
guished Special Committee, composed of members of the New York,
Chicago, Los Angeles, New Orleans and Washington bars, under the
chairmanship of Dudley B. Bonsai, Esq., of New York, and aided by
an able professional staff, has considered the Federal Loyalty-Security
Program presently in force.
At the outset the Committee has recognized, or rather proclaimed,
that there is "no irreconcilable conflict between liberty of the citizens
on one side and national security on the other." The keynote of the
Committee's philosophy is sounded in these words: "if fear of totali-
tarianism were to force us into coerced uniformity of thought and
belief, we should lose security in seeking it." 2 The Report makes the
further valid point that it is our "ideal of freedom and liberty, far
more than our economic system, which appeals to other peoples and
attracts them to our side, and so contributes to our national security." 3
Quoting from President Eisenhower's 1956 message to Congress on
the State of the Union, the Report reminds us that our weapons, in
the struggle that now engages the free world, "are the principles and
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that in the past made America a living promise of freedom for all
mankind." 4
Finding that "the emphasis on liberty as well as security is
essentially conservative in its adherence to established and tested
principles," 5 the Report recommends certain modifications in our
Government's personnel security program. Lest it be thought "pre-
sumptuous for private citizens to take upon themselves the responsi-
bility of proposing to our Government far-reaching changes in this
field" 6 the Committee has justifiably expressed the opinion that it is
"appropriate" for members of the bar to do this; for the American
bar "has always been, and must always be, alert in the protection of
the liberties on which our country was founded as well as of other
measures essential to national security." 7 The Committee suggests
that, if the present Loyalty-Security Program is modified in accor-
dance with its proposals, that Program will "have its proper place
in halting those who would abuse liberty and will at the same time
encourage the continuing growth of the nation's strength through the
achievements of its citizens." 8
Part One of the Report, only eight pages long, consists of a single
chapter entitled "Liberty and Security." Concluding that chapter
the Committee quotes with telling effect the following statement by
the Chief Justice of the United States, taken from an article he wrote
for the November 1955 issue of the magazine Fortune:
In the present struggle between our world and Communism, the temptation to
imitate totalitarian security methods is a subtle temptation that must be resisted
day by day, for it will be with us as long as totaliarianism itself.9
The Report tells us that 6,000,000 public and private employees
are subject to seven federal personnel security programs. The only
civilian federal employees not covered are those who work for Con-
gress and the federal courts. Civilian employees of the government's
executive branch are subject to Executive Order 10450; and regula-
tions of the Civil Service Commission are applicable to classified civil
service personnel. On June 30, 1955, 2,371,373 persons were covered
by these programs.
In March, 1955, 86,000 persons were covered by the program of
the Atomic Energy Commission, which applies to that agency's em-
ployees and also to employees of firms contracting with it. There is
also the Armed Forces Industrial Security Program, administered by
the Department of Defense, which reported late in 1955 that clearance









tary service contractors, who had access to "classified" information.
Then there is the Port Security Program, under .vhich as of December
31, 1955, clearance had been granted to 425,334 American seamen and
395,271 longshoremen. Finally, there is a separate program covering
the relatively few Americans who are employed by international
organizations.
These figures provide some idea of the enormous sweep of the
Loyalty-Security Program as a whole, under which is determined the
"suitability" for employment (in government service and in industry)
of a large segment of our employable population.
Part Two of the Committee's Report is only eighteen pages long.
It consists of Chapter II, dealing with "The Communist Threat," and
Chapter III, outlining "The Counter-Measures by the United States,
Including the Loyalty Security Program." Those chapters present
the reasons why personnel security programs are considered necessary
and refer to various security measures, fraditionally available or more
recently devised: e.g., prosecution for treason, -or under the Smith Act
of 1940 for advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force,
as well as counterespionage, loyalty oaths and the like. This part of
the Report is a proof of the lawyer's passion for thoroughness in
making a record. Like Part One it may be quickly skimmed.
Chapter II fairly sets forth a variety of popular notions of "The
Communist Threat," which may strike some as being superficial, or
even outdated. This reviewer finds it not so much a reasoned analysis
of the present situation in world politics (which may be shifting and
devel6ping new and significant trends), as a workmanlike marshalling
of established points of view. But it would be ungracious, and unfair,
to criticize the Report for not testing and evaluating some of the con-
clusions it sets forth regarding the nature and direction of "The Com-
munist Threat" today. The Committee's assignment was to consider
the security program-not to reinterpret the situation that makes the
program necessary.
The meat of the Committee's Report appears in its Part Three,
which consists of Chapters IV through VII. There, in eighty-three
closely packed and solidly documented pages, one finds an admirable
description of the present personnel security programs, their admin-
istration, their effect on the employees and applicants for employment
who are subject to them, and their cost in money. In Chapter VII,
which merits the most thoughtful consideration, the achievements of
the programs are weighed on the scales of national interest against
the damage they may have done to the very security they were in-
tended to serve.
Limitations of space make it impossible to do more than empha-
size the principal shortcomings of the existing system to which the
Report calls attention. The seven programs now in force apply stan-
dards of suitability for employment which are not uniform. They
employ varying procedures to attain their ends-some of which are
fairly subject to criticism on the ground that they do not sufficiently
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secure the rights of the individuals concerned. Administration of the
machinery of security clearance is far from uniform. "Derogatory
information," in a security file, may block the employment of an ap-
plicant for a position (or his transfer from one position to another)
without his being given the opportunity of meeting it. There is the
problem of the professional informant, who may or may not be worthy
of credence. Similarly, there is perhaps unnecessary concern with
positions that are "nonsensitive" in character.
One of the worst features of the present system may be its effect
on the scientific research that is so important to national defense in
the modern world. The Report quotes a statement by the Los Alamos
Chapter; Federation of American Scientists which must give pause:
In granting clearance to anyone there is always involved a calculated risk,
but it seems to us that in the past the calculation has given the greatest weight
to the negative aspect of keeping secrets inviolate and very little weight to the
positive aspect of keeping ahead of our competitors by means of fresh ideas
and positive achievements. 10
Putting it differently, the Report paraphrases a statement by the
former president of the Federation, Dr. M. Stanley Livingston:
a security system which was sufficiently tight and compartmentalized to
have forestalled the loss of secrets through the treachery of Klaus Fuchs would
have restricted scientific progress so severely that the atomic bomb could not
have been completed in time to be used in the war against Japan.1"
Part Three of the Report, in its entirety, together with Appendix
B (setting forth the pertinent statutes, orders and regulations), may
be regarded as an indispensable manual for any practicing lawyer who
is called upon to represent .a client caught in the toils of the present
security system. The Committee and its staff have done a praise-
worthy job of collating and analyzing the materials he will need. The
only reservation to be noted is that if the Report's index were a little
more complete, its nuggets of knowledge would be easier to dig out.
However, the conscientious lawyer will wish to read all of Part Three
and Appendix B; and it will both deepen his understanding and
sharpen his professional tools to read it with great care.
Part Four, consisting of Chapter VIII, presents the Committee's
recommendatioris for improving the existing system, with a convinc-
ing statement of supporting reasons. The Committee favors a unified
security program, centrally administered, which would recognize the
close logical relationship between suitability for the job (personnel
security) and the need to "classify" information that really ought to
be closely guarded. It is proposed that job clearance be required for






cording to the Committee, should be defined as one whose occupant
would have access to material classified as "secret" or "top secret";
and, in addition, one that has "a policy-making function" bearing
"a substantial relation to national security." Is
A uniform standard for judging suitability for employment in a
sensitive position is proposed: "whether or not in the interest of the
United States the employment or retention in employment of the in-
dividual is advisable." 14 Such a standard seems quite adequate. The
Committee proposes procedures for the preferring of charges, and for
their hearing and determination, that are effectively keyed to American
concepts of due process of law. (Laymen sometimes call it ordinary
fair play.)
The Committee has expressed the belief that adoption of its pro-
posals would free our personnel security system of "the weakness and
defects" it now exhibits, and would simultaneously afford adequate
protection to the nation's security. The present reviewer whole-
heartedly concurs.
BARENT TEN EycK.*
13 P. 141. A position which effects national security, has been defined by
the Supreme Court as one which ". . . relates only to those activities which
are directly concerned with the Nation's safety, as distinguished from the general
welfare." Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536, 543 (1956) (emphasis added).
24 P. 149.
* Member of the New York Bar.
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